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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E. STEELE 
TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON 
and W. FRED HURST 
Appellants/Petitioners, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS and THE CAREER 
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD of the 
State of Utah, ] 
Respondents/Agencies. ) 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/ 
) PETITIONERS 
Case No. 20040376 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS /PETITIONERS DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E. 
STEELE, TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON AND W. FRED HURST 
APPEAL FROM THE UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
I 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2) (a) confers appellate 
jurisdiction upon the Utah Court of Appeals to review 
appeals resulting from the final orders of formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies. This case is an 
appeal by Appellants/Petitioners Dan Leatham, Robert E. 
Steele, Tim Slocum, Harold W. Johnson and W. Fred Hurst 
(herein the * Petitioners") from a final order issued by the 
Utah Career Service Review Board (herein the UCSRB"), a 
State agency, on April 14, 2 004, which final order was 
styled, "Decision and Final Agency Action" (herein the 
"CSRB's Decision") / 
II 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the CSRB err by determining that an employee's 
objective fear of retaliation by management can never, as a 
matter of law, constitute excusable neglect so as to toll 
the twenty (2 0) working day limitation period for the filing 
of a grievance under U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5) (a) (i&ii) (1999)? 
This issue was preserved below at R. 000268; R. 000419-431. 
Standard of Review: This issue involves one of general 
law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference 
given to the CSRB's Decision below. Taylor v. Dep't of 
Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
2. Did the CSRB commit reversible error by failing to 
make any finding(s) of fact to support its legal conclusion 
that Petitioners' excusable neglect was extinguished such 
that the twenty (20) working day limitation period expired 
prior to the filing of Petitioners' grievance? This issue 
was preserved below at R. 000425-430. 
Standard of Review: This issue involves one of general 
1. A copy of the CSRB's Decision is set forth in the 
Addendum submitted herewith as Exhibit A. 
2 
law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference 
given to the CSRB's Decision below. Taylor v. Dep't of 
Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
3, Did the CSRB commit reversible error by 
determining that the twenty (20) working day limitation 
period was not tolled due to the misconduct of the Utah 
Department of Corrections (herein "the UDOC")? This issue 
was preserved below at R. 000423-424, 000473. 
Standard of Review: This issue involves one of general 
law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference 
given to the CSRB's Decision below. Taylor v. Dep't of 
Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
Ill 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are applicable to the 
case on appeal and each of the following are attached as a 
part of the Addendum as Exhibits E through L (pursuant to 
Rules 24(a) (6) and 24(a) (11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure): 
1. Constitutional provisions: 
a. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 (Open 
Courts Provision). 
3 
2. Statutes: 
a. U.C.A. 67-19-3.1(g)(2000). 
b. U.C.A. 67-19a-101, et. seq. (1991). 
c. U.C.A. 67-19a-202(l)(a&b)(1991). 
d. U.C.A. 67-19a-303(3) (1991) . 
e. U.C.A. 67-19a-401(4) (a&b) (1999) . 
f. U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5) (a&b) (1999) . 
3. Administrative Rules: 
a. CSRB Administrative Rule R137-1-2(2004). 
b. Department of Human Resource Management Rule 
R477-8-6(8) (c) (i&ii) (1998) . 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, CASE NATURE, COURSE, PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Petitioners filed their grievance2 on January 30, 199 8, 
requesting they be made whole for on-call time they worked 
but which had not been paid to them by the UDOC. R. 000004. 
On May 22, 2000, UDOC's Administrative Law Judge, R. Spencer 
Robinson, (herein UALJ Robinson"), conducted a hearing at 
the departmental level in the grievance process and 
submitted his Report and Recommendation (herein XXALJ 
Robinson's Report") to UDOC's then Executive Director Mike 
Chabries (herein nMr. Chabries). R.000015.3 ALJ Robinson 
2. It is undisputed that Petitioners were career service 
employees who are statutorily authorized to pursue 
resolution of disputes through the grievance process enacted 
by the Legislature and which is codified at U.C.A. 67-19a-
101, et seq. (1991). 
3. A copy of ALJ Robinson's Report is set forth in the 
4 
determined that Petitioners were entitled to receive on-call 
time as requested in their grievance and concluded that Mr. 
Chabries had the statutory discretion to provide Petitioners 
with up to one (1) year of on-call compensation that accrued 
prior to the date of their grievance. R. 000018. 
On January 19, 2 001, Mr. Chabries accepted ALJ 
Robinson's Report that Petitioners were entitled to receive 
the on-call compensation that they sought, but then Mr. 
Chabries limited the award of compensation to the twenty 
(2 0) working day time period preceding the filing of 
Petitioners' grievance.4 R. 000023-24. Petitioners then 
timely advanced their grievance to the Career Service Review 
Board on or about February 5, 2001. R. 000004. 
On or about May 2, 2 001, the UDOC filed a Motion to 
Dismiss and a Motion in Limine in the proceedings before the 
CSRB. UDOC's Motions were premised on the theory that 
Petitioners were not entitled to receive any on-call 
compensation beyond the twenty (20) working days authorized 
by Mr. Chabries in his January 19, 2 001, decision. After 
briefing, and on October 12, 2001, CSRB Hearing Officer K. 
Allan Zabel (herein H.O. Zabel) concurred with the UDOC's 
position and granted UDOC's Motion in an Order styled 
Addendum submitted herewith as Exhibit C. 
4. A copy of Mr. Chabries7 decision is set forth in the 
Addendum submitted herewith as Exhibit D. 
5 
"Decision on Agency's Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine 
including Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decision." R. 000193. On October 20, 2001, Petitioners 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CSRB. R. 
000203. On December 26, 2001, H.O. Zabel issued his decision 
denying Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and 
Supplemental Decision on Agency's Motion to Dismiss. R. 
0002 51. On January 2, 2 002, Petitioners timely appealed to 
the CSRB. R. 000380. 
On October 3, 2002, the Career Service Review Board 
("CSRB") issued an Order of Remand directing H.O. Zabel to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding whether Petitioners 
could demonstrate excusable neglect regarding any delay(s) 
in the filing of their grievance. R. 000337-339. After an 
evidentiary hearing, H.O. Zabel issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision after Remand.5 R. 0003 64-
376. Petitioners again timely appealed to the CSRB on 
January 20, 2003. R. 000385. 
After briefing and oral argument, the Career Service 
Review Board entered its final order on April 14, 2004, 
styled ''Decision and Final Agency Action," upholding H.O. 
Zabel's decision and limiting Petitioners' requested relief 
to twenty (2 0) working days prior to the filing date of 
5. A copy of H.O. Zabel's decision is set forth in the 
Addendum submitted herewith as Exhibit B. 
6 
their grievance. R. 000490-519. On May 12, 2004, 
Petitioners timely filed their Petition for Review of Final 
Administrative Agency Action with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of filing their original grievance on 
January 30, 1998, Petitioners were management career service 
employees in the Utah Department of Corrections' (herein the 
"UDOC") and were assigned to the Division of Institutional 
Operations.6 R. 000015. 
During the period from January of 1992 until July of 
1997, the UDOC was under the direction of a prior 
administration headed by then Executive Director Lane 
McCotter (herein uMr. McCotter"). R. 000365; R. 000525 
(Transcript p. 30-32). During Mr. McCotter's reign, and 
prior administrations, Petitioners were directed not to 
submit time sheets that included any on-call time but were 
required to work on-call time for which they were not paid 
any on-call compensation. R. 000015; R. 000525 (Transcript 
p. 115-118, 140-141, 150-151, 157-159). During this time 
6. Petitioners Dan Leatham and Tim Slocum remain employed 
by the UDOC. Petitioners Harold W. Johnson, W. Fred Hurst, 
and Robert E. Steele retired from the UDOC subsequent to the 
filing of the grievance. 
7 
period, Petitioners were informed by the UDOC executive 
personnel that Petitioners were not entitled to be paid for 
on-call time because their positions were designated as 
"FLSA exempt." 
During the period commencing in June of 1997 through 
the filing of their grievance on January 30, 199 8, 
Petitioners were paid on-call compensation for those limited 
circumstances wherein they were designated as the ''officer 
in charge" (herein xxOIC")- R. 000015; R. 000525 (Transcript 
p. 115-118, 140-141, 150-151, 157-159). The UDOC continued, 
however, to mislead Petitioners regarding Petitioner's 
entitlement to additional on-call compensation they were 
owed by virtue of being assigned commute vehicles, and by 
being required to have cell phones and pagers. R. 000525 
(Transcript p. 115-118, 140-141, 150-151, 157-159). The 
UDOC has not disputed that Petitioners were entitled to 
receive on-call compensation in addition to those periods 
when they were not in an on-call status as the OIC. 
Prior to July of 1997, UDOC has not disputed that 
Petitioners had an objective fear that, if they challenged 
the management/personnel practices of the UDOC 
administration, they would be subjected to retaliatory 
8 
transfers or other negative personnel actions. R. 000015-
17, 000373, 000375. H.O. Zabel explicitly found Petitioners 
objectively feared retaliation from the UDOC administration 
prior to July of 1997 and that the same constituted the 
necessary excusable neglect that would warrant the tolling 
of the timelines for Petitioners to file their grievance.7 
H.O. Zabel's determination was based on several instances of 
retaliatory misconduct by the UDOC administration that 
personally involved Petitioners or in which Petitioners had 
knowledge through performance of their duties.8 
It is only after H.L. "Pete" Haun (herein "E.D. Haun") 
was appointed Executive Director of the UDOC in July of 1997 
that the issue of Petitioners' objective fear of relation is 
in dispute.9 Unfortunately, neither H.O. Zabel, nor the 
7. See, Exhibit B in the Addendum at page 10 (R. 000373). 
8. In H.O. Zabel's decision dated January 8, 2 0 01, he made 
Supplemental Findings of Fact numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
17, 18, 23 and 24 which included explicit findings of 
intimidation, coercions and reprisals by the UDOC personnel 
identifying at least ten (10) specific instances of 
retaliation against employees for filing grievances or 
complaints against the UDOC. R. 000364-376. See, also, 
Exhibit B in the Addendum at pages 2-5. 
9. After ALJ Robinson issued his Report in May of 2000, 
E.D. Haun ordered Plaintiffs to attempt to resolve their 
grievance by meeting with Mr. Haun's designee, Scott Carver. 
R. 00022. At the meeting, no offer was ever made by the 
9 
CSRB, have identified at what point in time, if ever,10 
Petitioners' objective fear of retaliation allegedly 
evaporated between July of 1997 and the filing of 
Petitioners' grievance on January 30, 1998. Petitioners' 
objective fear of retaliation constitutes excusable neglect, 
thereby entitling Petitioners to relief beyond the twenty 
UDOC, but rather Mr. Carver told the Petitioners that the 
filing of their grievance is "just something you don't do 
over this kind of issue." R. 000525 (Transcript p. 125-126, 
164-166); R. 000368 (Supplemental Findings of Fact no. 23 
and 24). Mr. Haun subsequently retired from the UDOC 
without issuing a final decision on ALJ Robinson's Report. 
Mr. Chabries replaced Mr. Haun and thereby had the 
obligation to make the final departmental decision required 
by the statutory grievance process. Significantly, the UDOC 
did not call Mr. Chabries to testify regarding why he had 
limited Petitioners' compensation to the twenty (20) working 
day time period preceding the filing of Petitioners' 
grievance. 
10. .Id. Given Mr. Carver's attitude at the xxsettlement 
meeting" identified in footnote 9, supra, Petitioners submit 
their objective fear continued through the date of the 
evidentiary hearing before H.O. Zabel. Ironically, E.D. 
Haun's uncontroverted and unchallenged testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing before H.O. Zabel was that it takes up 
to seven (7) years to change an institutional culture with a 
fear of retaliation, particularly for an institutional 
culture as deeply seated as the UDOC. R. 000525 (Transcript 
p. 206-207); R. 000367-368 (Supplemental Findings of Fact 
no. 17). When asked whether the fear of retaliation had 
completely dissipated in the UDOC during his reign, Mr. Haun 
replied, "Not totally, I'm not naive." R. 000525 (Transcript 
p.206, line 3 through p.207 line 21). The UDOC did not 
present any evidence (either through its own witnesses or 
cross-examination) identifying what date it believed 
Petitioners' objective fear of retaliation had ceased. 
10 
(2 0) working days preceding the filing of their grievance. 
IV 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The excusable neglect exception (to the 
twenty (20) working day limitation period contained in 
U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5)(a)(1999)) constitutes a statutory 
tolling mechanism that implements the Legislature's intent 
that employees may pursue grievances without reprisal as set 
forth in U.C.A. 67-19a-303(3) and 67-19-3.1(g). 
Petitioners' objective fear of retaliation triggered the 
excusable neglect exception to the twenty (20) working day 
statute of limitations provided in U.C.A. 67-19a-
401(5)(a)(1999), thus tolling the twenty (20) working day 
statute of limitations. Absent an explicit finding of fact 
specifying the date that Petitioners' excusable neglect 
abated, the CSRB committed reversible error that warrants 
reversal of the CSRB's Decision. 
POINT II: The UDOC's misconduct tolled the application 
of the twenty (2 0) working day limitation until such time as 
Petitioners obtained actual knowledge of the UDOC's 
concealment/misconduct. Petitioners thereafter timely filed 
their grievance warranting reversal of the CSRB's Decision. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO ON-CALL COMPENSATION 
FOR A TIME PERIOD BEYOND TWENTY (20) WORKING DAYS 
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THEIR GRIEVANCE 
A. Petitioners' Excusable Neglect Tolled the Twenty (20) 
Working Day Statute of Limitations Applicable to the Filing 
of Grievances by Career Service Employees. 
In U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5) (a&b) (1999), the Legislature has 
enacted a twenty (20) working day limitation period for the 
filing of grievances by career service employees, to-wit: 
(5)(a) Unless the employee meets the requirements 
for excusable neglect11 established by rule, an 
11. Given the unparalleled brevity of the statute of 
limitations applicable to a career service employee's right 
of file a grievance, Petitioners would submit the "excusable 
neglect" exception reflects an apparent Legislative intent 
to implement a xxtolling" of the twenty (2 0) working day 
limitation period. See, generally, Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 
742, 753 (Utah 2002)(statute may impose "discovery rule" 
tolling applicable statute of limitations). To hold 
otherwise would potentially result in the complete 
abrogation/vitiation of a career service employee's right to 
file a grievance because state agencies could willfully 
violate an employee's rights without trepidation because the 
scope of the remedy to the employee is limited to only 
twenty (2 0) working days in the absence of excusable 
neglect. Moreover, a rigged and inflexible twenty (2 0) 
working day limitation period may present constitutional 
deficiencies under Utah Open Courts Clause because such a 
short time period essentially deprives employees of any 
effective remedy. See, Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1993)(three (3) month statute of limitation 
period for filing of habeaus corpus petition is 
unconstitutional, inter alia, the three (3) month period is 
too brief). Further, by standing on a "hard and fast" 
twenty (20) working day rule, the CSRB is fomenting and 
encouraging employees to immediately file grievances lest 
12 
employee may submit a grievance for review under 
this chapter only if the employee submits the 
grievance: 
(i) within 2 0 working days after the event 
giving rise to the grievance; or 
(ii) within 2 0 working days after the employee 
has knowledge of the event giving rise to the 
grievance.12 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an 
employee may not submit a grievance more than one 
year after the event giving rise to the 
grievance. U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5) (1999). 
(emphasis supplied) 
their rights will be quickly foreclosed. Petitioners do not 
believe the Legislature intended such a result because it 
would obviously be counterproductive to an efficient and 
harmonious workplace. 
12. Id. Additionally, subsection (i) appears to 
contemplate that an employee who has actual knowledge of the 
event giving rise to a grievance, sans excusable neglect, is 
required to file his/her grievance within twenty (2 0) 
working days but an employee without actual knowledge of the 
event giving rise to his/her grievance has twenty (2 0) 
working days after receipt of actual knowledge of the event 
in which to file his/her grievance. The Legislature thus 
imposed an actual knowledge standard not a notice (i.e., 
knew or should have known) standard. Further, these two (2) 
subsections, when read in conjunction with the prefatory 
excusable neglect language in U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5)(a), 
suggests the Legislature intended to provide for a tolling 
of the limitations period in the circumstance where the 
employee lacks actual knowledge of the event giving rise to 
the grievance. 
13. Although this section appears to be a statute of repose 
that would be unconstitutional under Berry ex rel. Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and its 
progeny, Petitioners would, in all likelihood, not have 
appealed to the CSRB if Mr. Chabries had authorized payment 
of on-call time for the year preceding the filing of their 
grievance. 
13 
As demonstrated by the emphasized language in Section 
5(a), a career service employee is not bound by the twenty 
(2 0) working day limitation period if he/she can demonstrate 
xv
 excusable neglect" for not filing his/her grievance. In 
accordance with the Legislature's direction, the CSRB has 
defined excusable neglect to be: 
xwExcusable neglect' means the exercise of 
due diligence by a reasonably prudent 
person and constitutes a failure to take 
proper steps at the proper time, not in 
consequence of the person's own 
carelessness, inattention, or willful 
disregard in the processing of a grievance, 
but in consequence of some unexpected or 
unavoidable hindrance or accident." R137-
1-2(2004)(Emphasis supplied). 
As demonstrated herein, Petitioners' objective fear of 
retaliation by the UDOC constitutes excusable neglect that 
tolled the twenty (2 0) working day limitation period in 
dispute herein. 
B, The Excusable Neglect Exception is a Legislative 
Mechanism Created to Safeguard Employees' Grievance Rights 
and Prevent Reprisals. 
In the CSRB's organic statute, the Legislature 
explicitly prohibited state agencies from taking reprisals 
against employees.14 At first blush, however, this statutory 
14. U.C.A. 67-19a-303(3)(1991) provides: 
14 
prohibition appears to be meaningless because the CSRB's 
organic statute does not vest the CSRB with any 
jurisdictional authority to adjudicate issues involving 
reprisals.15 As such, the Legislature did not give the CSRB 
the power to directly remedy any violation(s) of the 
reprisal prohibition statute but the CSRB's administrative 
rule defining "excusable neglect" appears to address such 
"(3) No person may take any reprisals against any 
career service employee for use of grievance 
procedures specified in this chapter." 
Further, in the Utah State Personnel Management Act 
(herein "the USPMA") at U.C.A. 67-19-3.1(g)(2000), the 
Legislature required the Department of Human Resource 
Management (herein "the DHRM") to design and implement a 
career service system that includes: 
Mg) [P]roviding a formal procedure for 
processing the appeals and grievances of employees 
without discrimination, coercion, restraint, or 
reprisal." (Emphasis supplied). 
15. The CSRB's jurisdictional statute does not include the 
authority to adjudicate issues involving reprisals: 
"(1)(a) The board shall serve as the final 
administrative body to review appeals from career 
service employees and agencies of decisions about 
promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, 
written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of 
personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable 
administration of benefits, reductions in force, 
and disputes concerning abandonment of position 
that have not been resolved at an earlier stage in 
the grievance procedure." U.C.A. 67-19a-202(1991). 
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management misconduct by denominating the same as an 
"unavoidable hindrance." H.O. Zabel concurred with the 
foregoing legal analysis in his Decision dated January 8, 
2001, to-wit: 
"To allow an administration to create or 
maintain an atmosphere in which employees are 
afraid to exercise their rights and lay claim 
to benefits for which they qualify, because 
they know that such an exercise will result in 
adverse personnel action, is contrary to the 
intent and purpose of the Personnel Management 
Act. Therefore, this Hearing Officer must 
agree with Grievants [Petitioners] that fear 
of retaliation prior to July 1997 was 
sufficient on the facts of this case to 
constitute an unavoidable hindrance, and 
imbued Grievants' failure to file a timely 
grievance with excusable necrlect for purposes 
of §67-19-401 (5) (a) . "16 (Emphasis supplied). 
H.O. Zabel7s decision is underpinned by the well-
established legal principle that a statute of limitations is 
tolled when the party asserting the same (i.e., the UDOC) 
either engages in misconduct or there exists other 
exceptional circumstances that make application of the 
statute of limitations "unjust or irrational."17 Thus, H.O. 
16. S<ee, Exhibit B at page 10. (R. 000373). 
17. As recently noted by the Utah Supreme Court: 
"Thus, 'statutes of limitations begin 
running upon the happening of the last 
event necessary to complete the cause of 
16 
Zabel appeared to suggest that if Petitioners had filed 
their grievance in July of 1997, they would have been 
entitled to the "made whole" relief sought in their 
grievance. The CSRB disagreed with H.O. Zabel and held, as 
a matter of law, that an objective fear of retaliation does 
action.' Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 
1235, 1236 (Utah 1998). In certain 
instances, however, the discovery rule 
tolls the limitations period until facts 
forming the basis for the cause of action 
are discovered. Id. at 50-51. The 
discovery rule applies: 
(1) in situations where the discovery 
rule is mandated by statute; (2) in 
situations where plaintiff does not 
become aware of the cause of action 
because of the defendant's concealment 
or misleading conduct; and (3) in 
situations where the case presents 
exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would 
be irrational or unjust, regardless of 
any showing that the defendant has 
prevented the discovery of the cause 
of action. Warren v. Provo City 
Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 
1992)(footnote citations omitted). 
'Under the discovery rule,' Nthe 
limitations period does not begin to 
run until the discovery of facts 
forming the basis for the cause of 
action.' Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51 
(quoting O'Neal v. Div. of Family 
Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah 
1991)(quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 
86))." Spears v. Warr, 44 P.2d 742, 
753 (Utah 2002)(Emphasis supplied). 
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not constitute excusable neglect: 
vvIn reaching our decision herein, the Board 
notes that the statutory framework set forth 
in the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures 
Act can only protect an employee from actual 
retaliation not from fear, whether real or 
supposed, of such retaliation. By failing to 
file their grievance when the xvevent" 
occurred, Appellants essentially stripped the 
CSRB or its Hearing Officer of the ability to 
protect them against actual retaliation. The 
Board cannot allow this conduct any more than 
it could allow retaliation or reprisal against 
an employee exercising his or her right by 
submitting a grievance. This Board feels that 
any other ruling by it in the instant case 
would only foster what the statute explicitly 
prohibits. For this reason, the Board finds 
as a matter of law, that fear of retaliation 
in and of itself, is insufficient to establish 
"excusable necrlect" under our rules. " 
(Emphasis supplied). See, the CSRB's Decision 
at page 27 set forth in Exhibit A in the 
Addendum. (R. 000516). 
The CSRB's legal conclusion is erroneous for a myriad 
of reasons. First, the CSRB presumes that it has the 
jurisdictional authority and power to adjudicate 
reprisal/retaliation issues when, in fact, the Legislature 
has not granted to the CSRB such jurisdictional authority.1 
The CSRB's analysis is therefore underpinned by, and 
premised upon, the false belief that it has authority to 
address management misconduct involving 
18. See, footnote 15. 
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reprisal/retaliation. Second, the CSRB's reliance upon the 
false premise that it has jurisdictional authority to 
address reprisal/retaliation would necessarily result in 
fostering and encouraging management misconduct because 
employees would have no recourse in the grievance process. 
Third, the CSRB's analysis effectively renders meaningless 
the Legislature's statutory prohibitions regarding 
reprisal/retaliation. Simply stated, the CSRB's analysis 
suggests that employees may only pursue a grievance 
involving actual retaliation when, in fact, the employee has 
no right to pursue such a grievance. And finally, the CSRB 
incorrectly interprets its own administrative rule defining 
excusable neglect: H.O. Zabel correctly determined that an 
objective fear of retaliation constitutes an unavoidable 
hindrance that would equate to excusable neglect. 
C» Petitioners' Objective and Reasonable Fear of 
Retaliation Post-July 23, 1997, was Sufficient to Constitute 
Excusable Neglect. 
Since the pervasively hostile work environment 
described herein was sufficiently hostile and intense so as 
to establish excusable neglect19 as to the Petitioners' 
19. Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court has noted that a 
statute of limitations (once tolled because of *duress") 
does not begin to run until the "duress" is terminated, see, 
19 
potentially filing of a grievance as of July of 1997, the 
question thus becomes - at what point in time after July of 
199 7 did the pervasively hostile environment abate (if ever) 
such that excusable neglect no longer existed the time lines 
for filing a grievance under the Grievance and Appeals 
Procedures began to run?20 
E.D. Haun testified that it takes seven (7) years to 
change a culture as deep seated as that found in the UDOC: 
"A. [By E.D. Haun] I think it takes, 
according to research that I've 
done, and it's a very interesting 
question - it takes seven years to 
change a culture, and especially one 
as deep seated as I think the 
corrections department had. And I 
don't think it started with the 
prior administration. I think the 
Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984), Petitioners 
submit the applicable time period for filing their grievance 
had not expired when they filed their grievance. In fact, 
E.D. Haun's admission that the *culture" in the UDOC had not 
changed by the time he left the UDOC in 2 0 01 persuasively 
suggests the time period for the Petitioners to file their 
grievance had not yet, as a matter of law, commenced running 
when they actually filed the same. 
20. In particular, Mr. Carver's attempt to convince 
Petitioners to dismiss their grievance after the issuance of 
ALJ Robinson's Report suggests that coercion and 
intimidation continued well after Petitioners filed their 
grievance. The additional five (5) examples of 
reprisal/retaliation discussed in the text, infra, further 
suggest the Petitioners' fear of retaliation was real -
subjectively and objectively - long after their grievance 
was filed. 
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culture that developed there started 
years and years ago, probably 
couldn't put a finger on it. 
I would like to think that we made 
some inroads. One of the very great 
concerns of mine of retiring when I 
did was that I hadn't given it the 
seven or eight years that I 
identified would be needed to make 
some very significant grounds. I 
will say this, that I know that the 
governor gave my successor explicit 
instructions to continue down that 
road... 
Q.[By Mr. Dyer] Do you think you 
overcame that perception while you 
were still there? 
A. Not totally. I'm not naive." 
(R. 000525)(Transcript at pages 206-
2 07)(Emphasis supplied). 
E.D. Haun's uncontroverted testimony that it would take 
seven (7) years to change the culture of fear of retaliation 
and retribution within the Department undermines H.O. 
Zabel's conclusion that Petitioners did not establish 
excusable neglect. In fact, there was no evidence, let 
alone substantial evidence, in the record to support H.O. 
Zabel's Decision that the culture magically changed on July 
23, 1997, when E.D. Haun was appointed. 
Further, there were five (5) examples of retaliation to 
demonstrate an ongoing fear at the time Petitioners filed. 
E.D. Haun appointed Fred Van Der Veur (herein "Van Der 
21 
Veur") as Director of the Division of Institutional 
Operations (DIO). Van Der Veur had a reputation among the 
Department as being "someone you did not want to cross." R. 
000525 (Transcript at pages 59-62, 105-106, 124-125). The 
first two (2) examples under the Haun administration involve 
Van Der Veur and Warden Hank Galetka (herein "Warden 
Galetka") exercising unlawful authority consistent with 
prior administrations. 
First, Warden Galetka ordered Petitioner Harold Johnson 
to change his scores from interviews on a promotion 
evaluation because one of the people Van Der Veur wanted to 
promote was too low on the list. R. 000525 (Transcript at 
pages 141-144). Johnson talked to E.D. Haun in his office 
about this situation, however, nothing was done about it. 
Id. Even ALJ Robinson had *heard about it." T.62. 
Second, Petitioner Tim Slocum was retaliated against by 
Warden Galetka and Van Der Veur for not wearing his pager 
24/7: 
XVQ. So you started working for Mr. Vandevere. 
Then what happened? 
A. And it was funny, we had - there was 
an incident at the prison, and of course 
I never - I didn't work for the warden at 
that time Hank Giletka, I was working 
directly for the division director. They 
had -paged me and they had called me on my 
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cell phone. I did not return the page or 
the call because I turned my pager and 
cell phone off at five o'clock. 
Q. Because you weren't in QIC? 
A. I weren't in QIC and we're not paid 
to have our pagers and cell phones left 
on. 
Q. This is after the grievance? 
A. Correct. So I had happened to walk 
into the warden's suite, and he 
cruestioned me why I did not respond 
to a page or the cell phone because 
they needed me at the incident. I 
said, "Because I have it turned off." 
And he says, "Well, if you worked 
for me, you would have it turned on." 
And I says, "Well, I don't work for 
you." And that was the end of the 
conversation. 
Well, it was interesting that and -
you know, our evaluations come along 
later that year, you have a midterm or 
you're supposed to have a midterm, which 
I've never had a midterm most of the 
time, and I received my performance - my 
evaluation from Director Vanderveur and 
he had recommended a satisfactory. 
Q. As opposed to one of the exceptional 
ratings? 
A. Right. 
Q. Was this the first time you'd ever had a 
satisfactory? 
A. First time. 
Q. And how did you -
A. In -
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Q. I'm sorry, go ahead. 
A. And that's probably in - you know, 
and I'm only recalling from the 
evaluations I had received, because I 
haven't received an evaluation every year 
because it doesn't happen sometimes. 
Q. What was your perception as to why 
you received that lower evaluation? 
A. That I had challenged or mocked, 
however you want to call it, somebody of 
higher authority. 
Q. Do you believe it was directly 
related to this not having the pager and 
cell phone on? 
A. Yes, yeah, for not having my pager and 
cell phone, of course, because that was the 
conversation." R. 000525 (Transcript at pages 
159-162)(Emphasis supplied). 
The third and fourth instances involved a continuation of 
the prior administration's use of transfers as a form of 
retaliation. Third, Supplemental Finding No. 18 found that Mr. 
LaBounty was involuntarily transferred during the Haun 
administration. See T.102-104. Fourth, Grievant Leatham was 
also involuntarily transferred under the Haun/Van Der Veur era 
and had been previously involuntarily transferred under the 
McCotter/Bartlett era.21 T. 121-122. 
21. Under the McCotter/Bartlett administration, Petitioner 
Leatham testified that before Bartlett became Deputy 
Division Director, Leatham had challenged certain decisions 
of Bartlett. When Bartlett became the Director, he 
transferred Leatham from the position of Bureau Chief to a 
Deputy Warden of Housing at Mt. Timpanogas. Not only did 
this change Leatham's status and significantly lower the top 
24 
And fifth, just before the remand hearing on December 5, 
2002, Leatham had been told by the warden that they were 
strongly considering moving him to the Training Academy to work 
as a training coordinator, a substantially lower position. 
Twice before in Leatham's 2 7 years with the Department, he had 
been involuntarily moved to substantially lower positions, under 
the McCotter/Bartlett era and under the Haun/Van Der Veur era. 
Due to the Grievance, his position was threatened again. 
D. Petitioners Had an Objective Fear of Retaliation, 
Thereby Establishing Excusable Neglect, Tolling' the Statute 
of Limitations, and Entitling Petitioners to an Award of Pay 
for On-Call Time Compensation Beyond the Twenty (20) Days 
Prior to the Filing of their Grievance, 
UDOC should not be permitted to reap a windfall gain by 
virtue of its own misconduct. It is undisputed that Petitioners 
had an objective fear of retaliation based on years of 
of his salary range but also the Bureau Chief position that 
he was transferred from two (2) months later was offered a 
12% raise that Leatham would have received had he not been 
transferred for speaking out and challenging Bartlett on 
certain issues. R.000525 (Transcript pages 121-122). 
Similarly, under the Haun/Van Der Veur administration, 
during the organizational changes, Leatham was re-assigned 
as Bureau Chief over Administrative Services for 
approximately a month, however, Leatham was vocal in 
challenging administration and a month later, Van Der Veur 
reassigned Leatham as a Correctional Administrator over 
Security, with significantly less responsibility. Leatham 
spoke with E.D. Haun about his concerns, and E.D. Haun only 
told Leatham that he would have to take it up with Van Der 
Veur. Van Der Veur in turn told Leatham that "if you don't 
like it, you can quit or retire..." R. 000525 (Transcript 
pages 122-124). 
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intimidation by the prior administrations of the UDOC. There is 
no question that the Petitioners have been wronged, that 
Petitioners worked for and earned the on-call compensation that 
they seek. The UDOC knowingly and willfully refused22 to pay 
Petitioners any on-call compensation until July of 1997, and 
only OIC (officer in charge) compensation after June of 1997. 
There is also substantial evidence of continued intimidation and 
unlawful exercise of authority constituting retaliation during 
the post-Haun administration supporting an ongoing fear at the 
time of and subsequent to the filing of Petitioners grievance.23 
For example, H.O. Zabel made explicit findings that the 
Executive Director McCotter, who immediately proceeded Mr. 
Pete Haun, had engaged in direct threats and retaliation 
against the Department's ALJ as late as July 7, 1997. R. 
22. The undisputed testimony of ALJ Robinson established 
that both the Haun administration and the predecessor 
McCotter administration were aware of their obligation to 
pay on-call time. R. 000525 (Transcript p. 66-67). 
However, the undisputed testimony of Petitioners was that 
UDOC, prior to the Haun administration had always told them 
that they were not entitled to any on-call pay, and during 
the Haun administration that they were only entitled to on-
call compensation when performing OIC duties. R. 000525 
(Transcript p. 115-8, 140-1, 150-1, 157-9). UDOC should not 
be allowed to use its own misconduct to justify "taking'' 
Petitioners' rights to receive compensation for on-call time 
by asserting Petitioners' claim is time-barred. 
23. See, footnote 20 and the five (5) examples of 
retaliation provided in the text hereinabove. 
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000366. The Department's ALJ, R. Spencer Robinson, also 
explicitly testified that, in his opinion, "objective" 
excusable neglect continued to exist after Mr. Haun took the 
helm of the Department through at least November of 1997. 
R. 000525 (Transcript p. 87, lines 4-25). That the H.O. 
made no finding regarding ALJ Robinson's testimony on this 
issue further supports Petitioners' contention that 
substantial evidence exists in the record to demonstrate 
excusable neglect existed long after E.D. Haun assumed the 
position of Executive Director of the Department. H.O. 
Zabel and the CSRB's decision that the excusable neglect 
immediately dissipated is untenable in light of the record 
evidence. 
Mr. Haun's own uncontroverted testimony was that it 
takes seven (7) years to change a culture of intimidation 
and retaliation: 
XNQ. [BY MR. DYER] In your mind, did you ever 
overcome the perceptions and the - -
A. [BY MR. HAUN] I think it takes, according 
to research that I've done, and it's a very 
interesting question - - it takes seven years 
to change a culture, and especially one as 
deep seated as I think the corrections 
department had. And I don't think it started 
with the prior administration. I think the 
culture that developed there started years and 
years ago, probably couldn't put a finger on 
it. 
I would like to think that we made some 
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inroads. One of the very great concerns of 
mine of retiring when I did was that I hadn't 
given it the seven or eight years that I 
identified would be needed to make some very 
significant grounds. I will say this, that I 
know that the governor gave my successor 
explicit instructions to continue down that 
road. 
Q. So from your perspective, that's still an 
on-going process in terms of solving fears of 
retribution? 
A. I hope - - yes... 
0. Do you think you overcame that perception 
while you were still there? 
A. Not totally, I'm not naive." R. 000525 
(Transcript p. 206, lines 3-22, T.207, lines 
19-21). (Emphasis supplied). 
E. The CSRB's Decision Fails to Contain Sufficient 
Findings of Fact that Would Justify Its Determination 
Regarding Excusable Neglect Thereby Warranting Reversal of 
the CSRB's Decision, 
In Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1991), this Court explicitly held that 
administrative agencies must provide sufficiently detailed 
findings of fact to support the ultimate conclusions reached 
or suffer reversal: 
"While it is true that the CSC [Career 
Service Council] stated its ultimate 
conclusions, administrative bodies may not 
rely upon findings that contain only ultimate 
conclusions... [FN8 ] 
FN8. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
described the detail required in 
administrative findings in order for a 
reviewing court to protect the public 
from "arbitrary and capricious 
administrative actions." Milne Truck 
Lines, 720 P.2d at 1378... 
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To that end, findings should be 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate factual 
conclusions, or conclusions of mixed 
fact and law, are reached. See 
generally, Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such 
findings, this Court cannot perform its 
duty of reviewing [an administrative 
body's] order in accordance with 
established legal principles and of 
protecting the parties and the public 
from arbitrary and capricious 
administrative action." Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1991)(Emphasis supplied). 
Neither the CSRB's Decision, nor H.O. Zabel's Decision 
of January 8, 2 001, contain any explicit finding of fact 
determining if, and/or when, Petitioners' excusable neglect 
abated. Absent such an explicit finding of fact, 
Petitioners submit that the CSRB's Decision must be 
reversed. 
II 
THE UDOC'S MISCONDUCT TOLLED THE TWENTY (20) 
WORKING DAY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS THEREBY 
WARRANTING REVERSAL OF THE CSRB'S DECISION 
As noted in Spears,24 a party cannot claim the benefit 
of the statute of limitations when it has engaged in 
24. See, the quoted text from the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Spears that is set forth in footnote 17 
hereinabove. 
29 
''concealment or misleading conduct'' or exceptional 
circumstances warrant the tolling of the applicable statute 
of limitations. Petitioners respectfully submit that a 
global view of the record in this case reveals that the UDOC 
engaged in concealment, misleading conduct and 
coercion/intimidation that created a culture of fear of 
reprisals/retaliation by career service employees. Thus, 
arguendo, Petitioners respectfully submit that Petitioners 
are entitled to have the twenty (20) working day statute of 
limitations deemed to be tolled in the event this Court 
disagrees with the Petitioner's analysis of the CSRB's 
Decision regarding excusable neglect. Simply stated, the 
UDOC should not be permitted to engage in serious misconduct 
and then utilize that serious misconduct as a shield against 
liability arising directly from that misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the CSRB's Decision and order the UDOC to rightfully 
award Petitioners' on-call compensation in a fashion 
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consistent with their "made whole" request contained in 
their grievance. 
DATED 
K 
this ^4 day of 2004. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Pnillip W. Dyer, Esq. 
Carey A. Seager, Esq. 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
MI/E /client/UPEA/UGOP/Leatham/Appeal Brief (Court of Appeals) 
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